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Abstract
Different from the works of Hwang (2007), we provide two extensions of the reduced games
introduced by Moulin (1985) and Voorneveld and van den Nouweland (1998) on fuzzy
non-transferable-utility (NTU) games, respectively. Based on the reduced games, we provide
an axiomatization of the core and show that the technique of the proof in Tadenuma (1992)
can not be applied to the core in the context of fuzzy NTU games.
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In the axiomatic characterization of solutions of standard coalition TU games, con-
sistency is a crucial property which has been applied comprehensively. If a solution is
not consistent, then a subgroup of agents might not respect the original compromise
but revise the payoﬀ distribution within the subgroup. The fundamental property
of solutions has been investigated in various classes of problems by applying reduced
games always. The core is, perhaps, the most intuitive solution concept in game the-
ory. Relating to the core of standard coalition games, there are two diﬀerent types
of imaginary reduced standard coalition games in the literature, the “max-reduced
game” (Davis-Maschler, 1965) and the “complement-reduced game” (Moulin, 1985).
Based on the max-reduced games, Peleg (1986) characterized the core on the domain
of standard coalition games whose core is non-empty. Subsequently, Serrano and Volij
(1998) characterized the core on the domain of all standard coalition games. Based
on the complement-reduced games, Tadenuma (1992) characterized the core on the
domain of standard coalition games whose core is non-empty. Related results may be
found in Peleg (1985), Voorneveld and Nouweland (1998), and so on.
The theory of fuzzy games started with work of Aubin (1974, 1981) where the
notions of a fuzzy game and the core of a fuzzy game are introduced. Hwang (2007)
extended the core and the max-reduced game to fuzzy NTU games. Inspired by
Serrano and Volij (1998), Hwang (2007) oﬀered axiomatizations of the core of fuzzy
NTU games.
Diﬀerent from the works of Hwang (2007), we provide an extension of the reduced
game introduced by Voorneveld and van den Nouweland (1998) to fuzzy NTU games.
Based on this extended reduction, an axiomatization of the core is proposed. On the
other hand, we extend to the fuzzy NTU games case the complement-reduced game.
Based on this extended complement-reduction, we show that the core is “not” the
only solution satisfying non-emptiness, individual rationality, and related consistency
on the domain of fuzzy NTU games with a nonempty core.
2 Preliminaries
Let U be the universe of players. If N ⊆ U is a set of players, then a fuzzy coalition
is a vector α ∈ [0,1]N. The i-th coordinate αi of α is called the participation level of
player i in the fuzzy coalition α. For all T ⊆ N, let |T| be the number of elements
in T. Instead of [0,1]T, we will write FT for the set of fuzzy coalitions. A player-
coalition T ⊆ N corresponds in a canonical way to the fuzzy coalition eT(N) ∈ FN,
which is the vector with eT
i (N) = 1 if i ∈ T, and eT
i (N) = 0 if i ∈ N \ T. The fuzzy
coalition eT(N) corresponds to the situation where the players in T fully cooperate
(i.e. with participation level 1) and the players outsides T are not involved at all (i.e.
they have participation level 0). Denote the zero vector in RN by 0N. The fuzzy
coalition 0N corresponds to the empty player-coalition. Note that if no confusion can
arise eT(N) will be denoted by eT.
To state the core of a fuzzy NTU game, some more notations will be needed. Let
α ∈ FN, A(α,N) = {i ∈ N | αi > 0,α ∈ FN} is the set of players who participate in
α. Let x,y ∈ RN. x ≥ y if xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ N; x > y if x ≥ y and x 6= y; x  y
if xi > yi for all i ∈ N. We denote RN
+ = {x ∈ RN | x ≥ 0N}. Let A ⊆ RN. A is
comprehensive if x ∈ A and x ≥ y imply y ∈ A. The boundary of A is denoted by
∂A, and the interior of A is denoted by intA. If x ∈ RN then x+A = {x+a | a ∈ A}.
1Deﬁnition 1 A fuzzy NTU game is a pair (N,V ), where N is a non-empty and
ﬁnite set of players and V is a characteristic function that assigns to each fuzzy
coalition α = (αi)i∈N ∈ FN \ {0N} a subset V (α) of RA(α,N), such that
1. V (α) is non-empty, closed and comprehensive,
2. V (α) ∩ (x + R
A(α,N)
+ ) is bounded for each x ∈ RA(α,N),
3. if x,y ∈ ∂V (eN) and x ≥ y, then x = y. (non-levelness)
Denote the class of all fuzzy NTU games by FG. Let (N,V ) ∈ FG. A payoﬀ
vector of (N,V ) is a vector x = (xi)i∈N ∈ RN. Then
• A payoﬀ vector x of (N,V ) ∈ FG is eﬃcient (EFF) if x ∈ ∂V (eN).
• A payoﬀ vector x of (N,V ) ∈ FG is individually rational (IR) if for all i ∈ N
and for all j ∈ (0,1], jxi / ∈ intV (je{i}).
Moreover, x is an imputation of (N,V ) if it is EFF and IR. The set of imputations
of (N,V ) is denoted by
I(N,V ) = { x ∈ RN | x is an imputation of (N,V ) }.
Deﬁnition 2 The core C(N,V ) of (N,V ) ∈ FG consists of all x ∈ ∂V (eN) that
satisfy for all α ∈ FN \ {0N}, (αixi)i∈A(α,N) / ∈ intV (α).
3 Axioms, V-N Reduction and Axiomatization
In this section, we characterize the core based on the extension of the reduced game
introduced by Voorneveld and van den Nouweland (1998).
A solution on FG is a function σ which associates with each (N,V ) ∈ FG a
subset σ(N,V ) of V (eN). Let σ be a solution on FG. σ satisﬁes Non-emptiness
(NE) if for all (N,V ) ∈ FG, σ(N,V ) 6= ∅. σ satisﬁes Eﬃciency (EFF) if for all
(N,V ) ∈ FG, σ(N,V ) ⊆ ∂V (eN). σ satisﬁes Individual rationality (IR) if for all
(N,V ) ∈ FG, σ(N,V ) ⊆ I(N,V ). σ satisﬁes One-person rationality (OPR) if
for all (N,V ) ∈ FG with |N| = 1, σ(N,V ) = I(N,V ).
Hwang (2007) extended to the fuzzy NTU games case the reduced game introduced
by Davis and Maschler (1965) as follows.
Deﬁnition 3 1 Let (N,V ) ∈ FG, x ∈ RN and S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅. The DM-reduced
game with respect to S and x is the game (S,V DM
S,x ) deﬁned by for all α ∈
FS \ {0S},
V DM









∈ V (α,β)} , otherwise .
1From now on we restrict our attention to bounded fuzzy NTU games, deﬁned as those games
(N,V ) such that, there exists a real number Mv such that for all α ∈ FN \{0N} and for all x ∈ V (α),
x(α) ≤ Mv. We use it here in order to guarantee that, in the Deﬁnition 3, V DM
S,x (α) is well-deﬁned.
2Consistency 2 requires that if x is prescribed by σ for a game (N,V ), then the
projection of x to S should be prescribed by σ for the reduced game with respect
to S and x for all S. Thus, the projection of x to S should be consistent with the
expectations of the members of S as reﬂected by their reduced game.
• DM-consistency (DMCON): If (N,V ) ∈ FG, S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅, and x ∈
σ(N,V ), then (S,V DM
S,x ) ∈ FG and xS ∈ σ(S,V DM
S,x ).
Converse consistency requires that if the projection of an eﬃcient payoﬀ vector x
to every proper S is consistent with the expectations of the members of S as reﬂected
by their reduced game then x itself should be recommended for whole game.
• Converse DM-consistency (CDMCON): If (N,V ) ∈ FG with |N| ≥ 2,
x ∈ ∂V (eN), and for all S ⊂ N, 0 < |S| < |N|, (S,V DM
S,x ) ∈ FG and xS ∈
σ(S,V DM
S,x ), then x ∈ σ(N,V ).
• Weak converse DM-consistency (WCDMCON): If (N,V ) ∈ FG with
|N| ≥ 2, x ∈ I(N,V ), and for all S ⊂ N, 0 < |S| < |N|, (S,V DM
S,x ) ∈ FG and
xS ∈ σ(S,V DM
S,x ), then x ∈ σ(N,V ).3
Hwang (2007) characterized the core by means of IR, OPR, DMCON and WCDM-
CON. Next, we extend to the fuzzy NTU games case the reduced game introduced
by Voorneveld and van den Nouweland (1998).
Deﬁnition 4 Let (N,V ) ∈ FG, x ∈ RN and S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅. The V-N reduced
game with respect to S and x is the game (S,V V N
S,x ) deﬁned by for all α ∈
FS \ {0S},
V V N










∈ V (α,β)} , otherwise .
“V-N reduced game” instead of “DM-reduced game”, we introduce the properties
of V-N consistency (VNCON), converse V-N consistency (CVNCON) and
weak converse V-N consistency (WCVNCON).
Lemma 1
1. The core satisﬁes V-N consistency.
2. The core satisﬁes weak converse V-N consistency.
Proof. The proofs are immediate analogues of Lemmas 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 in Hwang
(2007), hence we omit it.
Lemma 2 Let σ be a solution on FG. If σ satisﬁes IR and VNCON, then it also
satisﬁes EFF.
2The axiom was originally introduced by Harsanyi (1959) under the name of bilateral equilibrium.
For discussion of this axiom, please see Thomson (2005).
3The following axiom is a weakening of the previous axiom, since it requires that x be individually
rational as well.
3Proof. It can easily be deduced from the proof of Lemma 5.4 in Peleg (1985).
Inspired by Serrano and Volij (1998), we provide an axiomatization of the core on
fuzzy NTU games.
Theorem 1 A solution σ on FG satisﬁes OPR, IR, VNCON and WCVNCON if and
only if for all (N,V ) ∈ FG, σ(N,V ) = C(N,V ).
Proof. By Lemma1, the core satisﬁes VNCON and WCVNCON. And clearly, the
core satisﬁes OPR and IR.
To prove uniqueness, assume that a solution σ satisﬁes OPR, IR, VNCON and
WCVNCON. By Lemma 2, σ satisﬁes EFF. Let(N,V ) ∈ FG. The proof proceeds by
induction on the number |N|. If |N| = 1 then by OPR of σ, σ(N,V ) = I(N,V ) =
C(N,V ). Assume that σ(N,V ) = C(N,V ) if |N| < k, k ≥ 2.
The case |N| = k:
First we prove that σ(N,V ) ⊆ C(N,V ). Let x ∈ σ(N,V ). Since σ satisﬁes IR
and EFF, x ∈ I(N,V ). By VNCON of σ, for all S ⊂ N with 0 < |S| < |N|,
xS ∈ σ(S,V V N
S,x ). By the induction hypothesis, for all S ⊂ N with 0 < |S| < |N|,
xS ∈ σ(S,V V N
S,x ) = C(S,V V N
S,x ). By WCVNCON of the core, x ∈ C(N,V ). The
opposite inclusion may be shown analogously by interchanging the roles of σ and C.
Hence σ(N,V ) = C(N,V ).
The following examples show that each of the axioms used in Theorem 1 is logically
independent of the others. 4
Example 1 Let σ(N,V ) = ∅ for all (N,V ) ∈ FG. Then σ satisﬁes IR, VNCON and
WCVNCON, but it violates OPR.
Example 2 Deﬁne the solution σ on FG by
σ(N,V ) =

I(N,V ) , if |N| = 1
∂V (eN) ,otherwise.
Then σ satisﬁes OPR, VNCON and WCVNCON, but it violates IR.
Example 3 Let σ(N,V ) = I(N,V ) for all (N,V ) ∈ FG. Then σ satisﬁes OPR, IR
and WCVNCON, but it violates VNCON.
Example 4 Deﬁne the solution σ on FG by
σ(N,V ) =

I(N,V ) , if |N| = 1
∅ ,otherwise.
Then σ satisﬁes OPR, IR and VNCON, but it violates WCVNCON.
4 Moulin Reduction
In this section, we extend to the fuzzy NTU games case the reduced game introduced
by Moulin (1985). Given (N,V ) ∈ FG, S ⊆ N with S 6= ∅ and a payoﬀ vector x. The
4In order to show the logical independence of the used axioms |U| ≥ 2 is needed.
4M-reduced game with respect to S and x is the game (S,V M
S,x) deﬁned as: for
all α ∈ FS,
V M






“M-reduced game” instead of “DM-reduced game”, we introduce the properties
of M-consistency (MCON), converse M-consistency (CMCON) and weak
converse M-consistency (WCMCON).
Lemma 3 The core satisﬁes M-consistency.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is similar to Lemmas 9, 10 and 11 in Hwang (2007),
hence we omit it.
The following example shows that the core violates (W)CMCON.





{(r,s)|p + q ≤ 4} , if (p,q) = (1,1)
{t|t ≤ p + 1} , if p ∈ (0,1], q = 0
{t|t ≤ q + 1} , if q ∈ (0,1], p = 0
{(r,s)|r + s ≤ p + q + 1} , otherwise.
Let x ∈ I(N,V ) with xi = 3
2,xk = 5
2. Cleraly, V M
{i},x(1) = {t|(t, 5
2) ∈ V (1,1)},
V M
{k},x(1) = {t|(3
2,t) ∈ V (1,1)}, V M
{i},x(p) = {t|(t, 5
2) ∈ V (p,1)} for all p ∈ (0,1)
and V M
{k},x(q) = {t|(3
2,t) ∈ V (1,q)}. It is easy to derive that xi ∈ C({i},V M
{i},x) and
xk ∈ C({k},V M
{k},x). But, for all p ∈ (0,1], p · xi ∈ intV (p,0). That is, x / ∈ C(N,v).
The core is not (W)CMCON.
We say that the fuzzy NTU game (N,V ) is balanced if C(N,V ) 6= ∅. Let FG
c
denote the set of all balanced fuzzy NTU games. To end up this section, we show that
on FG
c, there are solutions other than the core satisfying non-emptiness, individual
rationality and consistency.
Lemma 4 On FG
c, there are solutions other than the core satisfying non-emptiness,
individual rationality and M-consistency.
Proof. Clearly, we have known that on FG
c, the core satisﬁes the three properties.
The remaining proof is by way of an example. Deﬁne a solution Cmw on FG by for
all (N,V ) ∈ FG ,
Cmw(N,V )
= {x ∈ I(N,V )|(αixi)i∈A(α,N) / ∈ intV (α) for all α ∈ FN, αi = 1 for some i ∈ N}.
Since Cmw is a solution on FG, it is also a solution on FG
c. Clearly, it satisﬁes
NE and IR on FG
c. To verify that Cmw satisﬁes MCON on FG
c, it can easily be
deduced from the proof of Lemma 1, hence we omit it. Similar to Lemma 1, it is also
easy to derive that Cmw satisﬁes WCMCON but it violates CMCON.
Furthermore, similar to Theorem 1, the solution Cmw is the only solution satisfying
IR, OPR, MCON and WCMCON on FG.
Remark 1 Based on Lemma 4, the core is “not” the only solution satisfying NE,
IR and MCON on the domain of balanced fuzzy NTU games. This means that the
technique of the proof in Tadenuma (1992) can not be applied to the core in the context
of fuzzy NTU games. The reason is that the core does not satisfy (weak) converse M-
consistency.
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